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Abstract—In this paper, we describe the problem of verifying
the integrity of a hard disk especially for forensics investigation
after the computer of a suspect has been seized. Existing solutions
do not provide a satisfactory solution to solve the problem. They
either require a huge amount of storage to store the hash values
of the sectors or may not be able to cope with the situation
in an effective way in case some sectors have been modified
(e.g. become bad sectors or deleted due to being part of the
Legal Professional Privilege items). We introduce to use Thierry-
Mieg[15]’s combinatorial group testing scheme, which seems to
be an unrelated topic, to design a scheme to compute the hash
values for the sectors of a hard disk. The storage for hash values
in our scheme can be significantly fewer than the best existing
solution while requiring similar amount of execution time. And
our scheme can accurately point out the sectors which have been
modified while existing solutions cannot guarantee this.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of electronic commerce, digital
forensics have become more and more important in a perpetual
race with criminals in the application of digital technologies.
Nowadays, it is very common to have evidence existing in
digital forms such as a deleted file in a hard disk of a suspect’s
computer. Due to the nature of digital information which
is easy to modify, one of the biggest problems is how to
effectively maintain the integrity of digital evidence. In this
paper, the following problem will be considered. Given a hard
disk seized from a suspect’s computer, how to effectively
check the integrity of the sectors inside the hard disk to
guarantee that the content of the hard disk remains the same
as before and has not been modified or tampered so that the
evidence found inside the hard disk can be accepted by courts.
Otherwise, the suspect can easily challenge the validity of
the collected evidence. Sometimes, the problem can be more
complicated that if the modified or tampered sectors are not
related to the evidence, we may try to see if the integrity of
this evidence itself can still be verified.
To maintain the integrity of a piece of data, the standard
technique is to first compute a hash value of the data and
store it somewhere securely. Then, recompute the hash value
again when the investigation is needed. If both values agree,
the data are believed to be unchanged. For example, in some of
the digital forensics tools (e.g., [1], [2]), they use the chained
hashing scheme to verify the integrity of data on hard disks. In
details, they compute one single chained one-way hash value
of all the disk sectors in a specific order. Then store the signed
hash value in a secure location for later comparison. However,
the technique can only provide a YES/NO answer about the
integrity of the whole hard disk which is not good enough.
In some cases when some of the sectors may suddenly turn
into bad after a long time (say a few months), it may be
useful to know which sectors affect the integrity and whether
the modified sectors are related to the evidence or not. In
other cases when the suspect is allowed to modify or delete
some of the sectors on his own (e.g. files classified as Legal
Professional Privilege data [3]), we may try to see if the
integrity of the evidence is not affected. So, the approach of
storing one single chained hash value is less attractive.
The other extreme technique is to compute a hash value for
each sector, then sign and store all these signed hash values
for later comparison. However, there will be too many hash
values to be stored. For example, for a hard disk with capacity
of 160GB, there will be 3.5 × 108 hash values to be stored.
It is about 5GB storage if each hash value has 128 bits. With
the size of hard disk getting larger and larger, this approach
is not appropriate either.
A. Related work
There are other approaches proposed by the researchers to
solve this problem. Kornblum [7] described Context Triggered
Piecewise Hash (CTPH) scheme to identify modified versions
of known files even if data have been inserted, modified, or
deleted in the new files. Although it may be possible to make it
work for the sectors in a hard disk (for a sector becoming bad
can be considered as a part of a file being modified), the CTPH
scheme requires a long running time of O(n log n) where n is
the data size, which implies a significant high overhead. For
example, when it is applied to a hard disk with huge size such
as 200G bytes, the execution time is about 40 times more than
reading the whole hard disk once.
Recently, Jiang et al. proposed a CHS scheme [4] and an
improved k-D scheme [5] to check the integrity of the sectors
in a hard disk by calculating more than one hash value for
each sector so as to increase the chance of it being verified
successfully even if there are bad/modified sectors. In terms of
execution time and storage for hash values, the k-D scheme
is more efficient than the above two techniques. However it
fails to verify some sectors’ integrity with a certain probability,
especially when more and more sectors are modified. It may
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be unacceptable in practice. We shall discuss it in detail in
section II.
Goodrich et al. [6] designed a novel scheme to organize
the indexing structures of several fundamental data structures
using Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) algorithm, such
that alterations from an original version can be detected and
identified. However, to meet their requirement of encoding
both the CGT matrix as well as the stored hash values within
the data structure without extra storage, their CGT construction
algorithm may not always produce a correct matrix (although
with low probability). This property is not that appropriate in
the computer forensics context. Besides, the number of tests
required is 6(d + 1)(d + 2) lnn where d is the maximum
number of errors and n is the number of total items. If d is
large, the number of tests is huge. So is the storage.
B. CGT background
Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) was first proposed by
Dorfman[8] during World War II when blood samples of
millions of draftees were subject to identical analyses in order
to detect a few thousand cases of syphilis. In the original
scheme, tester first extracts a few drops of blood samples in
a group and pools them together, then tests the mixed sample
to discover the existence of syphilis antigen in this group.
When the outcome of the group test is negative, all samples
in the group are good (disease-free). Otherwise, it implies
that some samples inside this group are defective and further
testing on them are necessary. Using this approach, the cost
of identifying which of n blood samples are tainted can be
significantly decreased by applying tests to judiciously chosen
subsets of the samples - given any constant upper bound on
the number of tainted samples, a logarithmic (in n) number
of tests suffices.
Due to the high efficiency of CGT, in the 1960s, Sobel
and Groll [9] revived the interest in it by giving many indus-
trial applications in detecting chemical leakage and electrical
blocking. At present, the applications of CGT are extended to
a variety of fields including DNA library screening, commu-
nication, coding theory (e.g. [10], [11]).
The key issue of CGT algorithm is how to construct the
testing groups, i.e. how to choose subsets of the set into
groups, to minimize the total number of tests with guaranteed
ability of locating the problematic cases (defectives). There are
several known methods for the construction of CGT algorithm,
e.g. set packing designs [12], direct constructions[13]. In [14],
Ngo and Du have made a survey on CGT algorithms and
have given a taxonomy of CGT constructions. In 2006, an
efficient non-adaptive combinatorial pooling construction, the
Shifted Transversal Design (STD) was proposed by Thierry-
Mieg[15], which is highly flexible and can be tailored to
function robustly. It will be used in our application.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we adapt CGT algorithm with the STD
construction to improve the hard disk integrity problem in the
efficiency of verification by saving the cost of storage or cal-
culation. Besides, bad (or modified) sectors can be accurately
identified if needed. It is necessary to claim that the paper does
not focus on developing novel CGT algorithm theoretically,
but singling out the most appropriate CGT algorithm and
adapting it to in the computer forensics area to help solve
the integrity checking problem.
The following shows the details of our contributions.
• We adapt Thierry-Mieg[15]’s CGT algorithm for the
verification of the integrity of the sectors in a hard disk
integrity. Our design is based on the STD construction
which is the most efficient approach for designing test
groups in a non-adaptive CGT algorithm.
• The scheme can significantly reduce the cost of verifying
the integrity of a hard disk by reducing the storage needed
for hash values (that is, the number of hash values to be
computed) by more than 10 times as the 3-D scheme
while maintaining a similar executing time.
• The scheme provides a guaranteed ability of identifying
all sectors accurately and detecting the sectors which have
been modified provided the number of such sectors is no
more than the threshold we set in the design.
• We compare the performance of our CGT scheme with
3-D scheme. The results show that our scheme is more
efficient than the 3-D scheme. We also show that this
scheme can be used by normal users if they want to keep
track the integrity of their hard disk frequently. The basic
idea is to recompute some hash values each day after they
modify some of the sectors.
D. Outline
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. k-D
[5] scheme and its limitations will be reviewed in Section II.
CGT construction by STD, especially the parameter design, is
described in Section III. Our experimental results are shown
and explained in Section IV, with a comparison to the results
of the 3-D scheme [5]. Section V concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF k-D SCHEME
The k-D scheme can be regarded as a trade-off between
the approaches of storing only one hash value for all sectors
and storing a hash value of each sector to address the issue
for checking the integrity of a hard drive even if some of the
sectors become bad sectors without storing the hash value for
each sector. For a hard disk with a total of N sectors which
are ordered in a k-dimensional plane, instead of computing
one hash for all sectors, the scheme computes a hash value
for each sector chain in different dimensions to increase the
chance of a sector being verified successfully even if there are
modified sectors on some of its chains. Refer to [5] for more
details. We give an analysis of its performance and highlight
the limitations of this scheme here.
First, although the number of hash values to be stored by
this scheme is already substantially fewer than the approach
of storing one hash value per sector, it still requires quite a
large number of hash values for small value of k (e.g. k = 3
for practical use). Sk = k × N (k−1)/k shows the number of
hash values required by the scheme. Ck = k×N calculate the
number of hash functions to be executed. When one sector is
updated, the scheme also requires to recompute the number of
hash values by Crk = k ×N1/k.
For example, given a hard disk of 1 × 109 sectors, which
is about 479GB if each sector contains 512 bytes, the 3-D
scheme needs a storage of 3 × 106 hash values and 3 × 109
hash calculations.
The other limitation of the scheme is that it may fail to
recognize an unmodified disk sector correctly due to other bad
sectors. For example, 3-D scheme is used where each sector
will be assigned to three different chains. If an unmodified
sector is assigned to three chains in which there is at least
one of the sectors in each chain that has been modified, the
hash values of these three chains will not be equal to the stored
hash values. Thus, there is no way to verify the integrity of this
sector. The probability to have such an unmodified sector (but
not verifiable) is Pfk = [1 − (1−Nb/N)(N
1/k−1)]k, where
Nb is the number of bad sectors.
In practical applications, it is desirable to have a better
scheme even if Pfk is small since the sectors affected may
relate to an important digital evidence. To conclude, the k-D
scheme has its limitations and improvement in efficiency and
reliability is desirable.
III. HARD DISK INTEGRITY CHECKING USING CGT
APPROACH
In this section, we first introduce the idea of adapting
CGT into the hard disk integrity checking problem. Then by
reviewing the selected construction - Shifted Transversal De-
sign (STD) [15], some specific concerns in terms of integrity
checking are also considered.
A. Adapting CGT to solve the hard disk integrity problem
Before looking into the hard disk integrity problem, let us
observe the following simple example.
Assume that a set C under test contains five items:
{1,2,3,4,5} and no more than one item in the set is defective.
We can design a pattern of group testing, which can be
represented by a 3× 5 binary matrix as follows.
M =
⎡
⎣
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
⎤
⎦ ,
where each column corresponds to an item of C and each
row corresponds to a group test and each cell (i, j) is 1 if and
only if item j is included in the test case i. In other words,
in our example, for test case 1, we include items 4 and 5
together. Therefore, with this testing pattern, if the group tests
on {1,3,5} (test case 3) and {2,3} (test case 2) show that one
of the items is defective while the test on {4,5} (test case
1) indicates all items are normal, we can conclude that item
3 is the defective one. One can check for other possibilities
that these three test cases suffice to deduce the defective item.
In this case, only 3 group tests but not 5 individual tests are
needed to find out the defective (problematic) item.
Briefly speaking, CGT is mainly applied to situations where
it is very expensive to test every single item individually
of a large number of items and it is necessary to pinpoint
the defective items precisely. When CGT is introduced into
our scheme to deal with the hard disk integrity problem, an
analogy should be made first. Assuming that an unmodified
sector in the hard disk is a normal item and a modified or
corrupted (bad) sector is a defective item, the cryptographic
hash of a subset of n sectors of the hard disk is analogous
to a mix of blood drops from a subset of n blood samples,
and comparing such a hash to what it is supposed to be, for
example, a stored hash, is analogous to applying a blood test
to the mix of blood drops. A mismatch between the computed
hash value and the stored hash value indicates that there is at
least one corrupted (bad) sectors in the subset for that hash.
From the results of all the comparisons, CGT algorithm can
precisely identify each sector as modified or not.
Applying CGT in the hard disk integrity problem will have
some advantages (or improvements). On one hand, since the
number of stored hash values equals the number of group
tests, the storage required for storing the hash values can
be greatly decreased by applying CGT. On the other hand,
CGT can provide a more accurate indication on which sectors
are modified while the 3-D scheme may loose the integrity
checking evidence of a certain sector if all the three hash
chains of each dimension for the sector are tainted by other
bad sectors on these chains.
B. CGT Construction by Shifted Transversal Design (STD)
CGT can be described more mathematically as an especially
efficient algorithm aiming at the problem to identify relatively
rare events from a large collection of items by applying basic
yes-or-no tests. Consider a set of n items which can only be
true or false, represented by n Boolean variables. If we call
a “pool”(test) a subset of variables and assume that at most d
variables are true, then the goal of CGT is to build a set of t
pools, where t is small compared to n, such that by testing the
values of the t pools, one can unambiguously determine the
values of the n variables. Practically, a CGT algorithm with n
items and t pools can be represented by a t×n binary matrix
where each cell (i, j) has a 1-entry if and only if item j is
contained in test i. Therefore, the pooling design of CGT can
be regarded as the problem constructing such a testing matrix.
In our scheme, STD, a novel construction approach for CGT
proposed in 2006, is used to provide higher efficiency than
other existing construction methods.
For ease of discussion, we recall the description of the
technical material on how to design the test groups (that is,
how to group the sectors into chains) Thierry-Mieg[15].
1) Construction algorithm of STD: A STD-based pool
construction starts with the specification of the number of
total items (n) and the maximum number of expected defective
items (d). These input parameters (n, d) are used to choose the
design parameters of the STD construction algorithm q and k,
where q must be a prime number. More precisely, STD is a
layered construction with k layers, each of size q × n. After
the design parameters are selected, the construction algorithm
will produce a t×n, 0− 1 matrix M = STD(n; q; k), where
t(= q×k) rows represent the group tests to be performed and
n columns represent the items (sectors) to be tested. Since each
item appears only once in each layer, each of the n columns
has k 1’s in it and each row has usually n/q 1’s in it. While
a detailed description and proof of the construction is available
in the original STD paper [15], we review how the algorithm
works here.
Given the design parameters q and k, the matrix M =
STD(n; q; k) can be constructed as follows. The STD has
a layered construction consisting of k layers of q × n
boolean matrices. For all j ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1}, let Mj be a
q × n boolean matrix representing layer L(j), with columns
Cj,0, · · · , Cj,n−1.
Let the circular shift operator, σq, be defined as
for all (x1, · · · , xq) ∈ {0, 1}q , σq [x1 x2 · · · xq]T =
[xq x1 · · · xq−1]T and C0,0 = [1 0 · · · 0]T . Note that σq
is a cyclic function and when applied q times maps {0, 1}q
onto itself, σsq [x1 x2 · · · xq]T = [x1 x2 · · · xq]T , s = q.
To design a layer L(j), for all i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}, construct
Cj,i = σ
s(i,j)
q C0,0 where if j < q : s(i, j) =
∑
Γ
c=0j
c i/qc,
if j = q : s(i, j) =
⌊
i/qΓ
⌋
. The layers L(j) are put together
to form M by STD(n; q; k) =
⋃
j=0L(j).
2) Choosing design parameters of STD: The detailed pro-
cedures of mapping the experimental parameters n and d to
the design parameters q and k are listed below.
(1) Choose a prime number q, with q < n. Start with the
smallest prime, 2.
(2) Find the compression power, Γ(q, n) = min{γ|qγ+1 ≥
n}, therefore Γ = log n/ log q − 1. Set k = dΓ + 1.
(3) Check if this choice of q and k satisfies the guarantee
requirements of identifying d defective elements, using the
inequality, k ≤ q + 1.
(4) If the inequality is satisfied, continue to step (5), else
choose the next prime in step (1) and repeat (2) and (3).
(5) For each q, find its corresponding compression power Γ
that satisfies q ≥ n1/(Γ+1), and calculate the number of tests
(t) needed by each (q, k) pair from t = q × k.
(6) Choose q and k to produce the desirable number of tests.
In general testing problem, the most desirable number of
tests is the least one in numbers produced by all possible
combinations of q and k. Nevertheless, when the application is
on the hard disk integrity problem, a special consideration on
the numbers should be taken since the hard disk integrity prob-
lem has a different setting: we need to consider minimizing
the number of hash values as well as minimizing the time to
calculate all hash values. In the traditional application of blood
testing case, a test of a group of ten individuals has the same
(computational) costs as a group of three individuals. But in
hash value calculation, the computational cost of calculating
a hash value of ten sectors will be more than that of three
sectors. In Section IV, three sets of design parameters of STD
are demonstrated with experimental results for comparison.
3) Decoding algorithm of STD: This subsection shows how
to interpret the testing results. That is, for each group (chain of
sectors), we compare the hash value with the stored value, then
depending on whether these two values agree, we can identify
which sector remains unchanged and which sector has been
modified (or turned as a bad sector).
With the designed pooling pattern, M , all the items (sectors)
under test can be tagged by STD according to the following
decoding algorithm: all the sectors present in at least one
normal pool (the test result shows that the hash values matched
for the group of sectors) are tagged normal (that is, the sectors
are not modified); any variable (sector) present in at least one
defective pool (in which the hash values of the group do not
match) where all other variables (sectors) have been tagged
normal, is tagged defective (modified). The STD algorithm
guarantees that the pooled design will be able to correctly
identify up to d defective (modified) items. STD is able
to provide such guarantees because it uses a combinatorial
procedure to ensure that no two items (sectors) are pooled
(grouped) together more than a minimum number of times,
to prevent ambiguous decoding results. Also, the number of
items pooled in each test is roughly the same, ensuring the
computational required for each chain is similar.
It is worthy to remark that if there exist more than d defec-
tive modified sectors, some sectors may not be tagged while all
tags produced by the above algorithm are still correct. These
untagged items may include both good items and defective
items. Such a situation can be detected by STD and once it
is detected some further operations need to be taken to check
whether any sector of evidence is included in the untagged
items or to retest these items if completeness is sought.
Fortunately, with STD’s well-chosen pooling design, untagged
items should only occur when the number of defective items
is much larger than expected maximum d. Furthermore, it has
been shown [16] recently that STD is also capable of detecting
much larger number of defective items than that it guarantees,
with a more sophisticated decoding algorithm. In other words,
using CGT, we will not treat an unmodified sector as modified
or vice versa as in the 3-D scheme.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We perform a series of experiments to test the performance
of CGT and compare it with that of 3-D scheme in terms of
(1) the number of hash values to be stored and (2) the time
required to compute the hash values. Also, we show that the
CGT scheme is feasible also for normal users to keep track
the integrity of their hard disks by keeping the hash values
of the sectors and recompute those hash values every day for
those chains in which there are modified sectors. We developed
our CGT scheme using STD construction, as well as the 3-D
scheme for comparison. We measure the costs of the actual
storage required for storing hash values for integrity check, the
actual running time for computations to generate the values
and the additional time for re-computations in the case that
there is a requirement to re-compute hash values when only
some sectors are updated legally.
Two test hard disks are used including HD #1 with capacity
of 55GB (60,011,642,880 bytes, 117,210,240 sectors) and
speed of 4,200 rpm, and HD #2 with capacity of 232GB
(250,056,737,280 bytes, 488,392,065 sectors) and speed of
5,400 rpm. The hardware of our experimental environment
includes a PC configured with an Intel R© CoreTM 2 CPU
(E6750 at 2.66GHz) and 1.97 GB RAM.
A. Experimental parameters and testing matrices for CGT
Following the procedures described in STD algorithm, set
the parameters n and d as 106 and 1, respectively. It means that
all sectors of a hard disk will be divided into smaller blocks,
each of which contains 106 sectors, and the number of bad
sectors contained in each block is expectedly at most 1, i.e., the
maximum probability for a block which contains bad sector is
10−6. Note that this probability is far more overestimated than
the common one, 10−9, which is in the range used previously
in the 3-D scheme [5].
As described in section III.B, with same experimental
parameters input, different sets of design parameters can be
chosen for STD to accommodate to various applications. Since
the performance of CGT algorithm depends on the matrices
(how the sectors are grouped into chains), it is essential to
study the effect of different parameters and the corresponding
matrices in our application. Thus, we choose three sets of STD
parameters to construct matrices for some practical consider-
ations. Using the chosen parameters, the scheme can handily
construct a CGT matrix using STD construction algorithm.
Note that the testing matrix needs to be constructed only once
which will be kept unchanged for the further use of distributing
sectors into test groups. The selected design parameters and
the corresponding testing matrices are:
(Ma) n = 106; qa = 7; ka = 8;Ma = STD(106; 7; 8);
(Mb) n = 106; qb = 101; kb = 3;Mb = STD(106; 101; 3);
(Mc) n = 106; qc = 1511; kc = 2;Mc = STD(106; 1511; 2).
Once the testing matrix of CGT is prepared, it can be
applied to each block of the hard disk to calculate hash values.
The cost of storage and calculations can also be deduced from
the matrix. Given the number of total sectors in the hard disk
N , the number of hash values to be stored per 106 sectors
will be q×k and the total number of hash values to be stored
for the whole hard disk will be q× k× N/n for CGT with
matrix M = STD(n; q; k). In practice, q and k are relatively
small constants. So the number of hash values is reasonable
and much smaller than [6] when d is large. In the 3-D scheme,
these two numbers will be 3 × N (3−1)/3 and 3 × N for the
whole hard disk. An additional question is that if there are
several sectors modified, how many hash values will be re-
computed and how many sectors will be read again and taken
into re-computation. For CGT, updating one sector will lead
to a re-computation of k× (n/q) hash calculations, while for
the 3-D scheme, the number of required hash calculations is
3×N1/3 for the whole hard disk.
Before we present the experimental results, we try to
analyze the three different settings. In the following, we only
consider the amount of hash values to be stored and the
number of hash computations to be calculated per 106 sectors.
For Ma, the constructed matrix has only 51 rows and requires
the minimum storage of only 51 hash values for every 106
sectors. The shortcoming of Ma is that it has 8 layers and
needs 8× 106 hash calculations for every 106 sectors. So, the
setting of Ma is suitable for the situations where storage for
hash values is the factor we concern the most. On the contrary,
Mc has the fewest number of layers and requires the minimum
computation (only 2 × 106 hash calculations for every 106
sectors), while it requires the maximum storage of hash values
(3, 022 hash values per 106 sectors). Mc is considered to be
applicable in situations where sectors are often changed, such
as the sectors will be changed in a daily basis when the scheme
is extended to normal users. As a tradeoff of storage versus
calculation, the requirement for storage and computation of
Mb is in the middle of that for the other two cases with
303 hash values to be stored and 3 × 106 hash values to be
computed per 106 sectors.
B. Results and discussion
The two hard disks are tested with Ma, Mb and Mc
separately and experimental results include absolute time (Ta),
computation time (Tc) and actual storage (S) as shown in Table
I. Here absolute time is the time for reading all sectors and
calculating hash values. We also check the pure reading time
for reading all sectors of a hard disk, denoted as Tp. Then, we
define the computation time as Ta − Tp. BTW, it takes 9,459
and 3,489 seconds for pure reading HD #1 and #2 respectively.
As a comparison, results for the 3-D scheme are also given.
The data in Table I are consistent with the principle and
analysis in the previous sections. Let us use HD #1 as an
example. When efficiency of storage is considered, applying
CGT with Ma can have a significant improvement that the
storage needed (0.4MB) is about two orders of magnitude
less than that of the 3-D scheme (29.8MB). Even with Mb,
the number of stored hash values for CGT (2.5MB) is still
tenfold less than that of the 3-D scheme, while both schemes’
costs of hash calculations are similar (6,768 and 6,786 seconds
respectively). When efficiency of time is considered, we found
that applying CGT with Mc requires the least amount of
computation (3,964 seconds).
We also perform some experiments to test the time of re-
computation (Tr) for hash values affected by the operation
of updating sectors, assuming that the updated sectors are in
the same block. The experiments are run only for HD #1.
As shown in Table II, more sparse the CGT matrix is, less
time and calculations are needed for re-computation. When the
number of updated sectors (# of updated sect.) is increased to
10, the number of calculations (# of cal.) for re-computation
with Ma is almost the same as that for computing all sectors
in the block. However, the number of calculations can be
decreased to a relative lower level when Mb, is applied. Using
Mc can further reduce the number of calculation since the
TABLE I
TIME AND STORAGE NEEDED FOR CGT SCHEME WITH Ma , Mb , Mc AND FOR 3-D SCHEME
HD #1 HD #2
CGT(Ma) Ta(Sec) / Tc(Sec) / S(MB) 20,488 / 11,029 / 0.4 7,431 / 3,942 / 0.1
CGT(Mb) Ta(Sec) / Tc(Sec) / S(MB) 16,227 / 6,768 / 2.5 5,287 / 1,798 / 0.6
CGT(Mc) Ta(Sec) / Tc(Sec) / S(MB) 13,423 / 3,964 / 25.1 4,704 / 1,215 / 6.1
3-D Ta(Sec) / Tc(Sec) / S(MB) 16,245 / 6,786 / 29.8 5,248 / 1,759 / 11.5
TABLE II
TIME NEEDED FOR RE-COMPUTATION WITH CGT SCHEME
# of updated sect. Tr(sec) # of cal. # of hash
1 CGT(Ma) / CGT(Mb) / CGT(Mc) 363.92 / 18.33 / 7.61 1,176,456 / 29,703 / 1,324 8 / 3 / 2
10 CGT(Ma) / CGT(Mb) / CGT(Mc) 500.22 / 135.72 / 8.42 6,394,972 / 287,128 / 13,237 50 / 39 / 20
100 CGT(Ma) / CGT(Mb) / CGT(Mc) 502.09 / 475.17 / 66.30 8,000,000 / 1,861,386 / 126,407 51 / 188 / 191
number of hash values affected (# of hash) is decreased to 20.
This preliminary experiment shows that it is better to apply
Mc matrix to users who often modify some of the sectors and
want to keep integrity evidence of the whole hard disk as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The hard disk integrity problem is one of the important
problems in digital forensics investigation. This problem is
solved by a seemingly unrelated technique, called combinato-
rial group testing. Then STD construction is adapted to verify
the integrity of sectors in a hard disk to ensure the digital
evidence stored in the sectors have not been modified even
if some of the sectors may become bad sectors or be deleted
legally during the investigation. It is shown to be used for
normal users to keep track the integrity of their hard disks.
Current practice is to “freeze” the whole hard disk once
the computer of a suspect has been seized. Future direction
includes whether a quick preliminary investigation on the
hard disk can identify the parts of hard disk to be frozen
instead of freezing the whole hard disk since the volume of a
hard disk is getting larger and larger, the hard disk integrity
problem as well as the investigation become more and more
difficult. Another future direction is to further improve our
scheme to minimize the storage for hash values and reduce
the computation time for computing the hash values. And how
practical the scheme is for normal daily users to keep track of
the integrity of their hard disks (e.g. to detect if any files have
been modified by virus) also requires more detailed analysis
and investigation.
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